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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
cannot escape the defense of the statute of limitations by pointing out a
disability - e.g., infancy - of the distributee.27
In Pulsifep v. Olcott28 the Supreme Court, Essex County, was con-
fronted with the question whether the insanity of a surviving spouse
tolled the statute of limitations until a committee was appointed. In
Pulsifep the intestate died in April of 1965, allegedly as a result of in-
juries caused by defendant. An order appointing a committee for the
widow was entered March 16, 1967. Subsequently, letters of adminis-
tration were granted and the committee instituted a wrongful death
action on March 6, 1968.
In view of the facts, the court reasonably concluded that the action
was timely commenced. A strict construction of CPLR 208 would have
dictated a contrary conclusion on the theory that a person is not enti-
tled to commence an action which requires a representative plaintiff
until that person is actually appointed to the fiduciary position. Never-
theless, the court recognized the injustice of such an interpretation in
the instant case inasmuch as there were only two remaining members
of the family, the incompetent wife and a young child, and had the wife
been sane, her appointment as administratrLx would have been rou-
tine.29 It would seem therefore that a practitioner seeking to avail him-
self of the tolling provisions contained in CPLR 208 must show that the
disabled party had a prior right to letters of administration. This would
serve to prove that the real party in interest was in fact the incapaci-
tated one.A0
CPLR 214(6): Second Department extends Flanagan rule of discovery
in foreign-object medical malpractice cases.
CPLR 214(6) provides that an action to recover damages for mal-
practice must be commenced within three years of its accrual. In medi-
cal malpractice cases, the general rule is that the cause of action accrues
on the date of commission of the wrongful act,31 unless treatment has
27 Mossip v. F.H. Clement & Co., 256 App. Div. 469, 10 N.Y.S.2d 592 (4th Dep't 1959),
agl'd, 283 N.Y. 554, 27 N.E.2d 279 (1940).
28 63 Misc. 2d 524, 312 N.Y.S2d 219 (Sup. Ct. Essex County 1970).
29 See N.Y. Sum. Cr. PRoc. Aar § 1001 (McKinney 1967).
So If the infant in Fulsifep had been an adult it could be speculated that the result
would have been different. For, the adult daughter, rather than the disabled wife, would
have the right to letters of administration. N.Y. Sum. Cr. PRoc. Act § 1001 (McKinney
1967). Since the real party in interest would be an adult, section 208 would be inapplica-
ble. Cf. Lamb v. DuPont, 181 Misc. 657, 42 N.Y.S.2d 49 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1943) (stat-
ute of limitations is not tolled by reason of infancy in derivative action where the real
party in interest is a corporation).
31 See Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 188 N.E.2d 142, 237
N.Y.S.2d 714, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 808 (1963); Conklin v. Draper, 229 App. Div. 227, 241
N.Y.S. 529 (Ist Dep't), affd, 254 N.Y. 620, 178 N.E. 892 (1920).
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been continuous, in which instance the claim accrues at the end of such
treatment.3 2 In Flanagan v. Mount Eden General Hospital8 3 the Court
of Appeals established an exception to the general rule, holding that in
cases "where a foreign object has negligently been left in the patient's
body, the Statute of Limitations will not begin to run until the patient
could have reasonably discovered the malpractice." 34 Flanagan was
predicated on the theory that in foreign-object cases no objection can be
made that the plaintiff's claim is false or frivolous; nor is there a causal
break between the negligence and the injury inasmuch as the plaintiff's
claim rests solely on the presence of a foreign object in his body.35
Flanagan was extended in Murphy v. Saint Charles Hospital.36
There, a prosthetic device was inserted into plaintiff's right hip. Four
years later the device broke, necessitating surgery for its removal. One
year thereafter, plaintiff commenced her action against the hospital. In
defense, the latter cited plaintiff's knowledge of the insertion as grounds
for classifying the action as one for negligent treatment, accruing on the
date of insertion. The Appellate Division, Second Department, ruled
that despite plaintiff's knowledge the same evidentiary considerations
underlying Flanagan were presented: "there is the same minimization
of prejudice... because of the availability and identifiability of the real
evidence involved and thus in critical part both cases are identical.1
3 7
As noted above, the general rule in New York continues to be that
the cause of action accrues on the date of malpractice - not on the date
of discovery. Indeed, as opposed to the initiative taken in some jurisdic-
tions,3 8 the New York courts have not viewed Flanagan as heralding a
rule of discovery in all malpractice cases;39 it is only in foreign-object
cases where the evidence is real and indisputable that unwary plaintiffs
have been afforded some relief from the severe effects of the statute of
limitations. Apparently, the courts are willing to sacrifice the legitimate
32 Borgia v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 187 N.E.2d 777, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319
(1962); cf. Siegel v. Kranis, 29 App. Div. 2d 477, 288 N.Y.S.2d 831 (2d Dep't 1968) (mal-
practice action against attorney accrued at the conclusion of the litigation).
3324 N.Y.2d 427, 248 N.E.2d 871, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1969).
34 Id. at 431, 248 N.E.2d at 873, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 27.
35 Id. at 430, 248 NXE.2d at 872, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 26.
3635 App. Div. 2d 64, 312 N.Y.S.2d 978 (2d Dep't 1970).
37Id. at 66, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 980.
38 See, e.g., Frohs v. Greene, 452 P.2d 564, 565 (Sup. Ct. Ore. 1969):
We do not believe that the danger of spurious claims is so great as to necessitate
the infliction of injustice on persons having legitimate claims which were undis-
coverable by the exercise of ordinary care prior to the lapse of two years from the
time of the act inflicting the injury.
See generally Sacks, Statutes of Limitations and Undiscovered Malpractice, 16 CLav.-MAR.
L. REv. 65 (1967).
39 1 WK&M 214.18.
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suitors in negligent treatment and negligent medication cases because
of the greater danger of specious claims.40
ARTICLE 3 -JURISDITION AND SERVICE, APPEARANCE
AND CHOICE OF COURT
CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii): Case illustrates factors to be considered when de-
termining whether a defendant has derived "substantial revenue from
interstate or international commerce."
CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii) extends jurisdiction of New York courts to en-
compass a nondomiciliary who commits a tortious act without the state
causing injury within the state and who "expects or should reasonably
expect the act to have consequences in the state and derives substantial
revenue from interstate or international commerce." Since foreseeabil-
ity of New York consequences is undeniable in many instances, the op-
eration of this subsection might expose a nondomiciliary to an unfair
burden of defending an action here were it not for the additional caveat
that the tortfeasor derive substantial revenue from interstate or inter-
national commerce. 41
To date, the phrase "substantial revenue" has escaped precise def-
inition. Given the rationale underlying CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii),42 it would
seem that this state of uncertainty is preferable to a condition of certi-
tude resulting from the establishment of arbitrary dollar volume or per-
centage of interstate income criteria.43 Indeed, in Path Instruments
International Corp. v. Asahi Optical Co.44 a federal district court dem-
onstrated the necessity of looking beyond the unadorned income quotas
to discern the existence of substantial revenue.
40 Cf. Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305
N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969); see also Rapson, "To Guard Against The Unfounded Actions.
The Issue Behind The Mendel Labels, 45 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 96 (1970).
41 To illustrate the hardship that would be visited upon a nondomiciliary absent the
"substantial revenue" requirement, consider the following question posed by Professor
McLaughlin:
Suppose a California tire dealer sold and installed a set of tires on an automobile
belonging to a tourist with New York license plates. Presumably, the plates would
make it foreseeable that the automobile would eventually return to New York,
and that if the tires should fail, an injury would occur in New York. Would it
be reasonable to require the tire dealer to defend the action in New York?
7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 302, supp. commentary at 132 (1966); see also Erlanger Mills, Inc.
v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502, 507 (4th Cir. 1956).
42 CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii) is premised on the relationship between income derived in inter-
state and international commerce and the ability to handle litigation away from the pri-
mary business location. 1 WK&M 302.10a.
4 3 See, e.g., Gluck v. Fasig Tipton Co., 63 Misc. 2d 82, 310 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1970), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 45 ST. JOHN's L. Rlv. 342, 348 (1970);
cf. Gillmore v. J.S. Inskip, Inc., 54 Misc. 2d 218, 282 N.Y.S.2d 127 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1967).
44 312 F. Supp. 805 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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